Fores v. Miranda

Facts:

Respondent was one of the passengers of a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive speed, the driver lost control, and the jeepney swerved to the bridge wall. Serious injuries were suffered by the defendant. The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. Petitioner denies liability for breach of contract of carriage, contending that a day before the accident, the jeepney was sold to a certain Carmen Sackerman.

Issues:

(1) Is the approval of the Public Service Commission necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the same?

(2) To what damages is the respondent entitled?

Held:

(1) Assuming the dubious sale to be a fact, the court of Appeals answered the query in the affirmative. The ruling should be upheld. The provisions of the statute are clear and prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or encumbrance of the property, franchise, certificate, privileges or rights, or any part thereof of the owner or operator of the public service Commission. The law was designed primarily for the protection of the public interest; and until the approval of the public Service Commission is obtained the vehicle is, in contemplation of law, still under the service of the owner or operator standing in the records of the Commission which the public has a right to rely upon.

(2) The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court of First Instance of Manila were reduced by the Court of Appeals to only P2,000, on the ground that a review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the trial court's appraisal, since the only evidence presented on this point consisted of respondent's bare statement that his expenses and loss of income amounted to P20,000. On the other hand, "it cannot be denied," the lower court said, "that appellee (respondent) did incur expenses"' It is well to note further that respondent was a painter by profession and a professor of Fine Arts, so that the amount of P2,000 awarded cannot be said to be excessive. The attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000 also awarded to the respondent are assailed on the ground that the Court of First Instance did not provided for the same, and since no appeal was interposed by said respondent, it was allegedly error for the Court of Appeals to award them motu proprio. Petitioner fails to note that attorney's fees are included in the concept of actual damages under the Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court deems it is just and equitable. We see no reason to alter these awards.

Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of transportation. Where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute of justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals.