Phoenix Construction v. IAC

Facts:

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue:

Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondent’s own negligence

Held:

We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.

The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.

People v. Delos Santos

Facts:

On the early morning of October 5, 1995, at the Maitum Highway in Cagayan de Oro City, a team of PNP members undergoing a Special Training Course were performing an Endurance Run. They were jogging at the right side of the lane. A speeding Isuzu Elf ran into them, resulting to deaths and injuries. The accused surrendered to the Governor, and was eventually convicted of Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder. He was sentenced to death by the Trial Court. Hence, this automatic review.

Issue:

Whether there was intentional killing or attempt to kill the policemen, or a mere reckless imprudence

Held:

From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on Glenn’s part. First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place of the incident was "very dark," as there was no moon. And according to PAGASA’s observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City covering a radius of 50 kilometers, at the time the event took place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was absolutely no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there was no way for the moon and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the highway. Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and black and green combat shoes, which made them hard to make out on that dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had neither reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving hand signals. Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other hand, the jogging trainees were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as Glenn’s vehicle was traversing. Worse, they were facing the same direction as Glenn’s truck such that their backs were turned towards the oncoming vehicles from behind. Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut Glenn’s testimony that he had been momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at the opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve. He must have been still reeling from the blinding effect of the lights coming from the other vehicle when he plowed into the group of police trainees. Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one “to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment he sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the same"; and more so if the one on the road is a person. It would therefore be inconceivable for GLENN, then a young college graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young children who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group with his truck.

We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. It is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe to grind against the police trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting them with intent to kill. Glenn’s offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the movement he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he done so, many trainees would have been spared.

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.

GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should have known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. By his own testimony, it was established that the road was slippery and slightly going downward; and, worse, the place of the incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or turning to the left side even if it would mean entering the opposite lane (there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction). It is highly probable that he was driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was driving within the speed limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due care under the existing circumstances and conditions at the time.

Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.

Ramos v. CA

Facts:

Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old robust woman, was normal except for her experiencing occasional pain due to the presence of stone in her gall bladder. She was advised to undergo an operation for its removal. The results in the examinations she underwent indicate that she was fit for the operation. She and her husband Rogelio met Dr. Hosaka, one of the defendants, who advised that she should undergo cholecystectomy. Dr. Hosaka assured them that he will get a good anaesthesiologist. At 7:30 a.m. on the day of the operation at Delos Santos Medical Center, Herminda Cruz, Erlinda’s sister-in-law and the dean of the College of Nursing in Capitol Medical Center, was there to provide moral support. Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez was to administer the anaesthesia. Dr. Hosaka arrived only at 12:15 p. m. Herminda saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the patient, and heard the latter say “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O, lumalaki ang tiyan.” Herminda saw bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the patient. She heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon. The doctor arrived and placed the patient in trendelenburg position, wherein the head of the patient is positioned lower than the feet, which indicates a decrease of blood supply in the brain. Herminda knew and told Rogelio that something wrong was happening. Dr. Calderon was able to intubate the patient. Erlinda was taken to the ICU and became comatose.

Rogelio filed a civil case for damages. The trial court ruled in his favor, finding Dr. Gutierrez, Dr. Hosaka, and the hospital, guilty of negligence, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Hence, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. However, it was found that the notice of the decision was never sent to the petitioner’s counsel. Rather, it was sent to the petitioner, addressing him as Atty. Rogelio Ramos, as if he was the legal counsel. The petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari. On the procedural issue, the Supreme Court rules that since the notice did not reach the petitioner’s then legal counsel, the motion was filed on time.

Issue:

Whether a surgeon, an anaesthesiologist, and a hospital, should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy

Held:

Res Ipsa Loquitor

Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. Mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown.

(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence;

(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and

(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.

Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.

Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence.

We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and control of private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and body. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.

Negligence of the Anaesthesiologist

The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of anesthesia is universally observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic accidents. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence. Erlinda's case was elective and this was known to respondent Dra. Gutierrez. Thus, she had all the time to make a thorough evaluation of Erlinda's case prior to the operation and prepare her for anesthesia. However, she never saw the patient at the bedside. She herself admitted that she had seen petitioner only in the operating room, and only on the actual date of the cholecystectomy. She negligently failed to take advantage of this important opportunity. As such, her attempt to exculpate herself must fail.

Opinion of Expert Witness

An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and clinical pharmacology. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of neurology. While admittedly, many bronchospastic-mediated pulmonary diseases are within the expertise of pulmonary medicine, Dr. Jamora's field, the anesthetic drug-induced, allergic mediated bronchospasm alleged in this case is within the disciplines of anesthesiology, allergology and pharmacology. On the basis of the foregoing transcript, in which the pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with medical authority, it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr. Jamora's testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium. Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical experience. Clearly, Dr. Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based on the above standard since he lacks the necessary knowledge, skill, and training in the field of anesthesiology. Oddly, apart from submitting testimony from a specialist in the wrong field, private respondents' intentionally avoided providing testimony by competent and independent experts in the proper areas.

Proximate Cause

Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. Instead of the intended endotracheal intubation what actually took place was an esophageal intubation. During intubation, such distention indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through the esophagus instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which carries oxygen is in the wrong place. That abdominal distention had been observed during the first intubation suggests that the length of time utilized in inserting the endotracheal tube (up to the time the tube was withdrawn for the second attempt) was fairly significant. Due to the delay in the delivery of oxygen in her lungs Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis.

Responsibility of the Surgeon

As the so-called "captain of the ship," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.

Responsibility of the Hospital

Hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.

The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's condition.

Damages

At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount established by the trial court at the time of its decision would be grossly inadequate to cover the actual costs of home-based care for a comatose individual. The calculated amount was not even arrived at by looking at the actual cost of proper hospice care for the patient. What it reflected were the actual expenses incurred and proved by the petitioners after they were forced to bring home the patient to avoid mounting hospital bills. And yet ideally, a comatose patient should remain in a hospital or be transferred to a hospice specializing in the care of the chronically ill for the purpose of providing a proper milieu adequate to meet minimum standards of care. Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy.

Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict. Temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases. As it would not be equitable - and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of justice - for the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded - temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care. In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a decade. Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in such care. They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.

Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now. The burden of care has so far been heroically shouldered by her husband and children, who, in the intervening years have been deprived of the love of a wife and a mother. Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify. Even the temperate damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner's condition remains unchanged for the next ten years. The husband and the children, all petitioners in this case, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient's illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a comatose patient. They, not the respondents, are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. For the foregoing reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropriate.

Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise proper.

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.