US v. Barias

Facts:

On November 2, 1911, defendant Segundo Barias, a motorman for the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, was driving his car along Rizal Avenue and stopped at an intersection to take on some passengers. He looked backward, presumably to be sure that all passengers were aboard, and then started the car. At that moment, Fermina Jose, a 3-year old child, walked or ran in front of the car. She was knocked down and dragged at some distance to death. Defendant knew nothing of this until his return, when he was informed of what happened. He was charged and found guilty of homicide resulting from reckless negligence.

Issue:

Whether the evidence shows such carelessness or want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant as to amount to reckless negligence

Held:

Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.

The evidence shows that the thoroughfare on which the incident occurred was a public street in a densely populated section of the city. The hour was six in the morning, or about the time when the residents of such streets begin to move about. Under such conditions a motorman of an electric street car was clearly charged with a high degree of diligence in the performance of his duties. He was bound to know and to recognize that any negligence on his part in observing the track over which he was running his car might result in fatal accidents. He had no right to assume that the track before his car was clear. It was his duty to satisfy himself of that fact by keeping a sharp lookout, and to do everything in his power to avoid the danger which is necessarily incident to the operation of heavy street cars on public thoroughfares in populous sections of the city. At times, it might be highly proper and prudent for him to glance back before again setting his car in motion, to satisfy himself that he understood correctly a signal to go forward or that all the passengers had safely alighted or gotten on board. But we do insist that before setting his car again in motion, it was his duty to satisfy himself that the track was clear, and, for that purpose, to look and to see the track just in front of his car. This the defendant did not do, and the result of his negligence was the death of the child.

We hold that the reasons of public policy which impose upon street car companies and their employees the duty of exercising the utmost degree of diligence in securing the safety of passengers, apply with equal force to the duty of avoiding the infliction of injuries upon pedestrians and others on the public streets and thoroughfares over which these companies are authorized to run their cars. And while, in a criminal case, the courts will require proof of the guilt of the company or its employees beyond a reasonable doubt, nevertheless the care or diligence required of the company and its employees is the same in both cases, and the only question to be determined is whether the proofs shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to exercise such care or diligence was the cause of the accident, and that the defendant was guilty thereof.

Standing erect, at the position he would ordinarily assume while the car is in motion, the eye of the average motorman might just miss seeing the top of the head of a child, about three years old, standing or walking close up to the front of the car. But it is also very evident that by inclining the head and shoulders forward very slightly, and glancing in front of the car, a person in the position of a motorman could not fail to see a child on the track immediately in front of his car; and we hold that it is the manifest duty of a motorman, who is about to start his car on a public thoroughfare in a thickly-settled district, to satisfy himself that the track is clear immediately in front of his car, and to incline his body slightly forward, if that be necessary, in order to bring the whole track within his line of vision. Of course, this may not be, and usually is not necessary when the car is in motion, but we think that it is required by the dictates of the most ordinary prudence in starting from a standstill.

NPC v. CA

Facts:

At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It further contended that there was no direct causal relationship between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and are of the nature of damnum absque injuria.

Issues:

(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the typhoon is a fortuitous event

(2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents

(3) Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria

Held:

(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results in loss or damage. Even if there was no contractual relation between themselves and private respondents, they are still liable under the law on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done." Act of God or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. In the case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners can not escape liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage.

(2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED", would not strike one to be of serious importance, sufficient enough to set alarm and cause people to take precautions for their safety's sake. The notices were not delivered, or even addressed to responsible officials of the municipalities concerned who could have disseminated the warning properly. They were delivered to ordinary employees and policemen. As it happened, the said notices do not appear to have reached the people concerned, which are the residents beside the Angat River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely did not receive any such warning. Indeed, the methods by which the defendants allegedly sent the notice or warning was so ineffectual that they cannot claim, as they do in their second assignment of error, that the sending of said notice has absolved them from liability.

(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the damage caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which presupposes that although there was physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous events. There is no question that petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble their intention may be. The end does not justify the means, particularly because they could have done otherwise than simultaneously opening the spillways to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.

City of Manila v. Meralco

Facts:

On June 8, 1925, there occurred a collision between a car owned by Meralco and driven by Sixto Eustaquio, and a truck belonging to the City of Manila. Eustaquio was prosecuted and found guilty of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was sentenced to pay P1788.27 plus fine of P900 and costs, with subsidiary imprisonment. Not being able to collect from the convict, the City of Manila proceeded against Meralco for subsidiary liability. Meralco set up the defense of a good father of a family. The trial judge thought it unnecessary to present the witnesses offered by the fiscal, and took cognisance of the records of the criminal case.

Issues:

(1) Whether the trial court may rely on the records of the criminal case to render judgment on the civil case

(2) Whether Meralco should be absolved from the liability

Held:

(1) The first error plainly has merit. As a general rule, a record in a criminal action cannot be admitted in evidence in a civil action except by way of inducement or to show a collateral fact. The very obvious reason is that the parties and the issues in a criminal action and a civil action are not the same. It is rudimentary that due process must be followed in the trial of all causes. No man or entity may be condemmed without a day in court. Manila Electric Company was not a party at the trial of the criminal case. By a coincidence, Attorney Carrascoso was both counsel for the defendant in the civil action. But there is lacking any proof showing that the Manila Electric Company supplied the lawyer for the accused in the criminal action and so is concluded by the judgment there rendered. It is our ruling that prejudicial error was committed in the admission by the trial court of Exhibits A to F, but that since the plaintiff made the proper offer to present its witnesses, the case should be remanded for a new trial.

(2) The Penal Code authorizes the imposition of subsidiary liability in default of the persons criminally liable. Article 20 of the Penal Code provides that this subsidiary liability shall "apply to masters, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies and misdemeanors committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties." It is under this provision that the City of Manila is attempting to collect damages from the Manila Electric Company. In connection with the Penal Code, there must be taken into view certain provisions of the Civil Code. It is provided in article 1903 that the obligation imposed for the damage to another caused by fault or negligence is enforcible against those persons for whom another is responsible. But it is added that "The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons subject thereto prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage." Art. 1902 provides "Civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code."

Manresa, speaking of article 1092 of the Civil Code, offers the following comment:

The Civil Code refers to the Penal Code as the rule applicable in the first place, since the latter determines and punishes the acts giving rise to said obligations, or creates said obligations, thereby determining their existence and is, therefore, for that reason of preferential application. But, then, as the Penal Code is concerned with, and is interested only in determining how the civil obligation it creates comes into existence and develops under the influence of the illicit character, it lays down only those rules inspired by those motives; and once the connection of that obligation with the criminal liability is established in its provisions, with the consequences that may be inferred from the fact that the former is based on the latter; and after an effort has been made, within the sphere of that civil responsibility, toward making the indemnification coextensive with the effects of the crime, and a special necessity, which is characteristic of punishment and is the subject matter of the Penal Code, has been shown in the provisions regulating said liability, the Penal Code, could not, without going beyond its one sphere, give all the rules relative to said obligations, nor did it have any necessity for doing so, because once the peculiar nature of said obligations is saved by its provisions, the essence thereof common to the other obligations must, as in the latter, be defined by the civil law, which will thus become an important source, although suppletory, of those derived from crime.

While the Civil Code, in its article 1092, simply makes reference to the Penal Code, yet, it is beyond doubt that by this reference it means those rules of a general nature which regulate the civil liability arising from the particular crimes or misdemeanors therein mentioned, and that, in connection therewith, they shall have the preferential application which this article recognizes in favor of the Penal Code.

With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or ommision not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would premit the master to escape scot-free by allging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action or misdemeanor.

In accordance with the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be set aside, and the record remanded to the lower court for a new trial.